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Opening the Black 
Box of Deliberation: 
What are Arguments 
(Really) Based On?
A theory-driven and exploratory analysis of the role of 
knowledge in the process of deliberation
von Lisa Reiber
abstract
How much knowledge do you need to form opinions and talk about them? 
Located within a broader body of work on the relation between knowledge and 
attitude formation, this research explores the role of knowledge in the process 
of deliberation by taking an in-depth look at a real-world deliberation exercise 
on social welfare in Germany. Deliberative theory is based on the assumption 
that while deliberating, informed citizens weigh information in order to form 
‘ideal’ opinions. Yet, empirical findings suggest rather low levels of political 
knowledge among the population. Taking a real-world case of deliberation 
on social welfare in Germany, this article has two goals: first, it draws on data 
collected on the level of knowledge regarding the German welfare system to get 
an initial insight into the distribution of political knowledge, which has been 
scarce to non-existent to date. Second, it applies a qualitative content analysis to 
explore the kind of information people in real-world deliberation exercises use 
as the basis for their arguments and ends with a discussion of the role of know-
ledge in group attitude-formation processes. While the results confirm previous 
findings on relatively low levels of political knowledge among the participants, 
this study raises three further issues that are relevant for understanding the role 
of knowledge in transferring theoretical deliberative norms and ideals to reality. 
These issues, which relate to the weighing of arguments, the handling of false or 
missing information, and the issue of procedural knowledge, are highlighted, 
and implications for further research and possible procedures for the transfer of 
normative deliberative goals to real-world deliberations are outlined.
Keywords 
deliberation; subjective knowledge; factual knowledge; information, arguments
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Introduction
We all hold opinions on a wide range 
of topics and have differing amounts of 
knowledge about them. If someone asked 
you about your opinion on the German 
welfare state, what would you base your 
opinion on and how would you commu-
nicate your views during a debate in order 
to persuade others? How much know-
ledge do you need to form opinions and 
talk about them? Research regarding the 
public‘s political knowledge suggests that 
people generally might not have access to 
a lot of knowledge to base their opinions 
on. While some individuals possess a lot 
of knowledge on some topics, knowledge 
levels in the population seem to be rather 
low in general and in relation to political 
issues particularly. 
One strand of research that theorizes about 
how people discuss and come to conclusions 
is deliberative theory. From this theoret-
ical perspective there are specific condi-
tions for successful deliberations, such as 
a knowledgeable, informed  citizenry and 
a rational exchange of arguments. Theories 
suggest that participants form a sort of 
group consensus by exchanging arguments, 
evaluating them and possibly altering their 
opinions in the process. Based on prop-
ositions regarding the role of knowledge 
within deliberative theory and findings 
on the real-world distribution of political 
knowledge within the population, one might 
ask: what knowledge do people draw on to 
discuss political issues within deliberative 
settings, given that they are not fully in-
formed? Do people know and talk about 
objective facts on the wealth distribution 
in Germany when discussing opinions on 
the German welfare state or do they base 
their arguments on subjective experiences? 
Research regarding knowledge and delib-
eration has so far focused largely on the 
effects that deliberative settings have on 
individuals’ political knowledge and the 
circumstances under which knowledge can 
be increased, but there is surprisingly little 
research focusing on the role of knowledge 
in actual deliberation (cf. Ryfe 2005) or the 
micro-mechanisms by which it operates (cf. 
Smets et al. 2014). Often, while partici-
pants’ knowledge levels can be evaluated 
with quantitative methods from question-
naires, the deliberation process itself is a 
black box. Many studies look at the effects 
of deliberation on opinion by analysing 
pre- and post-surveys, yet they do not 
actually look at the content of what is 
being said (see Bucy et al. 2014; e.g. Smets 
et al. 2014; Gastil et al. 1999; Fishkin et al. 
1999; Jacobs et al. 2009; Sturgis et al. 2005; 
 Morrell 2005). Even though these studies 
find changes in attitudes or knowledge lev-
els, the specific mechanisms leading to the 
change of attitude or increase in knowledge 
remain unclear. Regarding the process of 
deliberation, one could ask whether the 
debates were in fact rational and what kind 
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of knowledge the arguments were based 
on. The question of which information was 
utilized in the discussions and what was 
ignored or left out is also a relevant one. 
Especially when seeking to understand 
the process of attitude formation, it may 
be relevant to look at the actual discussion 
instead of pre- and post-evaluations. 
Within the broader literature on the relation 
between knowledge and attitude forma-
tion, this paper therefore opens the black 
box of deliberation and goes beyond the 
established survey methods to measure po-
litical knowledge with a qualitative content 
analysis of an actual debate. Empirically, the 
paper draws on discussion data gathered 
in the context of a Deliberative Forum 
(DF), as explained in greater detail in the 
introduction to this volume (see Heuer et 
al). It aims to explore the role of knowledge 
within real life deliberations by gaining 
an insight into the participant’s level of 
political knowledge regarding the welfare 
state as well as by assessing the different 
kinds of knowledge that participants base 
their arguments on. In a broader sense, this 
research is motivated by the desire to learn 
about how theoretical conceptualizations 
and ideal notions of deliberation are applied 
in real life in order to improve the transition 
from theory to practice. 
The remaining article is structured as 
follows: the next section focuses on the 
theoretical level and outlines the ideal 
assumptions of deliberative theory regard-
ing the role of knowledge in deliberations. 
Then, I shift the focus to the real-world 
application of deliberation and empirical 
findings in this regard. In the final step, I 
bring together and discuss the theoretical 
ideals against the backdrop of real-world 
application regarding the role of knowledge 
in the process of deliberation. The findings 
highlight three main issues that play a role 
in transitioning from deliberative theory 
to practice, namely the weighing of infor-
mation, the handling of false or missing 
information, and the issue of procedural 
knowledge in the attitude formation pro-
cess. In the conclusion, I introduce the 
concept of procedural knowledge and map 
out possibilities for improving real-life 
uses of deliberation.
Theoretical Assumptions: 
Deliberation and Knowledge
Although the use of the term deliberation 
has become widespread, there is no coher-
ent, conceptual definition of it (cf. Abelson 
et al. 2003; Burkhalter et al. 2002; Macedo 
1999; Niemeyer et al. 2007). As André 
Bächtiger (cf. 2010: 35) puts it: ‘beyond 
the bedrock agreement that democratic 
process should involve communication 
about, rather than merely aggregation 
of (fixed), preferences, there is not much 
consensus about how deliberation is best 
conceptualized.’ The main idea that has 
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been promoted by deliberation theorists 
such as Joshua Cohen (1998), Jürgen 
Habermas (1984), John Dryzek (2000), 
James Fishkin (1991), and others is that 
within certain deliberative settings, groups 
are able to make ‘better’ decisions regard-
ing societal problems. John Hibbing and 
Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (2002) state that 
deliberation should lead to ‘better citizens’, 
‘better decisions’, and a ‘better system’. 
With respect to attitude formation, delib-
eration can be seen as a process by which 
minds can be changed provided that indi-
viduals come into this setting with both a 
willingness and the means to communi-
cate, advocate, and ultimately to become 
persuaded along with and by others (cf. 
McCubbins et al. 2006: 14). What conditions 
enable productive deliberation? And what is 
necessary for people to be able to deliberate? 
In theoretical terms, James Fishkin (2005) 
suggests the following criteria based on the 
idea that deliberation is mostly rooted in the 
‘weighing’ of arguments in a discussion: the 
arguments need to be ‘informative’ as well 
as ‘balanced’ such that discussions include 
contrary arguments; they should also be 
‘substantive’, meaning that arguments are 
considered on their own and not based on 
who made them. The participants in delib-
erations are supposed to be ‘conscientious’, 
willing to talk and listen with civility and 
respect, and the deliberation itself should 
be ‘comprehensive’ and reflect all points of 
view held by significant proportions of the 
population (cf. Fishkin et al. 2005: 2). This 
normative concept of deliberation entails 
assumptions that do not hold true in so-
called ‘real-world’ deliberations, which is 
why a discussion has emerged around the 
question of which circumstances enable the 
achievement of the normatively described 
outcomes of deliberation (cf. Risse 2000; 
Bächtiger et al. 2010; Sachweh et al. 2006; 
Esterling et al. 2011; Thompson 2008; Ulbert 
et al. 2005). 
What does the literature say regarding the 
role that knowledge plays within delibera-
tion and the mechanisms underpinning it? 
First of all, normative deliberative theory 
postulates that deliberation takes place as a 
reasoned process, in which arguments are 
often backed up by objective facts, which in 
turn can stem from the participants’ knowl-
edge. Here, the role of knowledge is to serve 
as the basis for arguments and to give them 
more weight in order to convince others. 
As participants exchange information, this 
increases their knowledge, because they 
listen to the information and perspectives 
of others and take them in. ‘This occurs be-
cause deliberation requires that individuals 
transcend private concerns and that they 
engage with competing views, taking them 
into account as part of their evaluations’ (cf. 
Niemeyer et al. 2007: 500). Concerning the 
change in attitude, Thomas and Keith Pool 
(1987) point out that individuals’ informa-
tion affects their confidence in their beliefs, 
playing a role in the activation of values.
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Deliberative theory envisions that de-
liberation will enable citizens to develop 
more informed or reflective preferences 
than would otherwise be the case. Several 
empirical research projects have found 
that deliberation increases knowledge (see 
e.g. Min 2007: 1371; Fishkin et al. 2005; 
Gastil et al. 1999) and leads to opinion 
change on political topics, because it can 
enable participants to deeply engage with 
political topics, share information, and 
weigh alternatives. Findings show a clear 
positive association between deliberation 
and citizens’ political knowledge (Gastil 
and Dillard 1999). While it seems intuitive 
that deliberation will result in increased 
knowledge and attitude change and this 
has also been shown empirically, it is worth 
examining in detail the process of how 
deliberation affects political knowledge.
Real­world Implications: Political 
Knowledge and its Distribution
How can we conceptualize knowledge? 
Michael Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter (cf. 
1996: 10) offer a rather broad definition 
of political knowledge as ‘the range of 
factual information about politics that is 
stored in long-term memory’. Thus, infor-
mation is the key term that differentiates 
 knowledge from other belief systems, such 
as attitudes, values, or opinions. This type 
of knowledge—i.e. knowledge that an indi-
vidual actually has—is defined as objective 
 political knowledge. In addition to that, 
there is subjective political knowledge, 
which refers to information that an indi-
vidual believes he or she possesses. This 
distinction is especially important in the 
context of deliberation. While objective and 
subjective knowledge overlap with regard to 
objective facts, it is harder to assess whether 
claims based on an individuals’ percep-
tion of reality accurately depict the real 
world (cf. Maier et al. 2009: 143). Political 
knowledge can be distinguished in terms 
of its breadth and depth. Breadth refers 
to knowledge in different areas and depth 
refers to knowledge in individual areas. 
Research has found that the greater the 
amount of (objective) political knowledge 
an indi vidual has, the more new political 
knowledge is gained through media con-
sumption or election campaigns (cf. Oberle 
2012: 20). The concept of political know-
ledge also includes the normative question 
of what citizens should know about politics, 
and although there are multiple answers 
to this question, it is generally agreed that 
political knowledge should include stored 
information about the structures of the 
political system (‘what government is and 
does’ (cf. Barber 1969: 38)), its political 
institutions (cf. Neuman 1986: 196), and 
knowledge about current political questions 
(cf. Berelson et al. 1954: 308).
But what is political knowledge with re-
spect to deliberation on the social welfare 
state? Hard facts include knowledge on the 
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different programmes that are part of the 
social welfare system in Germany and how 
they emerged and developed. Other im-
portant facts may include information on 
the current economic situation in Germany 
and the current state of the job market. In 
order to form a reasoned opinion on the 
German welfare state, it is necessary to 
have some knowledge on the distribution 
of wealth in Germany, for example, on 
how unequally wealth is distributed in 
Germany or how many people are living 
in relative poverty.
Regarding the distribution of political 
knowledge in a very general sense, research 
finds that citizens’ knowledge falls short 
of the theoretical ideal (Butler et al. 1974; 
Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 2006) and 
most ordinary citizens know and think 
remarkably little about politics (Carpini 
et al. 1996). While the majority of these 
findings come from the United States, 
and although it has been shown that US 
citizens on average possess less knowledge 
than citizens of other western democra-
cies (cf. Almond et al. 1963; Carpini et 
al. 1996; Dimock et al. 1997; Bennett et 
al. 1996), studies on other countries also 
find low levels of overall knowledge (for 
Denmark see Paldam et al. 2000; for New 
Zealand see Karp 2006; for Netherlands 
see Vettehen et al. 2004). While findings 
show  generally low levels of overall know-
ledge, there are some political facts that 
are known by almost everyone (e.g. the 
recent US  president, cf. Carpini et al. 1996: 
70–74), but there are also topics where 
knowledge is almost non-existent—e.g. 
knowledge about arms control and nuclear 
weapons (Graham 1988). While there are 
numerous Anglo-Saxonian academic con-
troversies regarding political knowledge, 
literature on Germany is still fairly scarce, 
especially with regards to knowledge about 
the welfare system (Osterberg-Kaufmann 
2019: 4). Jürgen Maier et al. (2009) attri-
bute this to the poor availability of data on 
citizens’ knowledge (with a few valuable 
exceptions, e.g. the International Social 
Survey Programme/ISSP). A study by Rü-
diger Schmitt-Beck finds that only just 
about half of Germans knew the number 
of federal states in Germany (Schmitt-
Beck 1993). Studies have also found that 
Germans have a reasonable breadth of 
knowledge regarding the existence of po-
litical institutions such as NATO or the EU 
(cf. Rattinger 1994), but relatively limited 
knowledge of the German election system 
(cf. Schmitt-Beck 1993). 
Since the data and literature regarding po-
litical knowledge in Germany is very poor, 
there is even less information regarding 
the specific area of knowledge about social 
welfare availability. There has not been in-
depth research regarding specific areas of 
politics, which is why there are not many 
findings regarding the research question 
this paper asks about: namely the level of 
knowledge regarding social welfare. One 
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paper gives first insights into the knowl-
edge that 25 to 35 year-olds have of the 
German public pension system and finds 
that overall there is good knowledge of 
the basics and central concepts (cf. Brosig 
2016). However, accurate knowledge of 
individual regulations and other marginal 
aspects was much less common. The paper 
also finds that many participants signifi-
cantly overestimated the level of benefits 
and the redistribution mechanisms of the 
pension system and may therefore run the 
risk of having insufficient social security 
entitle ments in the long term (cf. Brosig 
2016). Having established the fact that 
although knowledge varies across topics, 
levels in the population seem generally low 
and that there is not much data regarding 
knowledge levels in Germany, I will con-
tinue to explore how knowledge can be 
measured and conceptualized.
Exploration: Conceptualizing 
Knowledge in Deliberation
Research focusing on the knowledge that 
people rely on in real-world deliberation has 
outlined the need for a broader conceptual-
ization of knowledge. As mentioned above, 
research mostly distinguishes between ob-
jective and subjective knowledge, with the 
method of data collection via ‘civic tests’ 
(Bucy et al. 2014; Thompson et al. 2006). 
With regard to the role of knowledge in 
deliberation, there is a need to broaden this 
theoretical conceptualization of knowledge 
to mean something other than a collection 
of facts. This would make it possible to de-
tect, explore and work with different kinds 
of knowledge that are not straightforward 
facts but ‘temporally and spatially situated’ 
(Thompson et al. 2006). Connected to this, 
David Ryfe (2006) finds that in the current 
debate, people do not merely exchange their 
knowledge via facts, but mostly commu-
nicate their knowledge and arguments in 
the form of stories that make complicated 
issues amenable to human understanding. 
In doing so, knowledge is not always stated 
explicitly, but is also communicated im-
plicitly, with participants relying on their 
mutual knowledge of the group to connect 
the implications of their story to the topic 
of debate. Another source of knowledge 
that might be found in deliberation is the 
use of heuristics or information shortcuts. 
Research from political psychology suggests 
that in their everyday reasoning, people tend 
to compensate for their lack of information 
by relying on heuristics and other cognitive 
shortcuts (cf. Popkin 1994; Sniderman et al. 
1993), which suggests that people might not 
argue based on direct knowledge but rather 
state opinions from sources that they trust.
Looking at the existing literature, what 
level of knowledge regarding the welfare 
state can be expected and what forms 
of knowledge will the participants base 
their arguments on? Since the topic under 
discussion is very specific and the Hartz 
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IV benefit we discussed in detail is not an 
area that a lot of people have spent time 
reading about, we can expect the level 
of knowledge not to be high. Regarding 
the kinds of knowledge, the theoretical 
deliberative process is envisioned as an ex-
change of ideas, knowledge, and opinions 
within a group discussion under special 
circumstances that leads to normatively 
‘better’ choices on the part of the partici-
pants. One would therefore theoretically 
expect to find participants deliberating 
based on objective facts and weighing the 
arguments against each other. On the other 
hand, real-world findings show low levels 
of knowledge in the general population 
and research on real-world deliberations 
suggests that opinions are often exchanged 
in the form of ‘stories’ and that knowledge 
can also appear in the form of situated 
knowledge rather than straightforward 
objective facts.
Procedure and Participants
In order to explore the role of knowledge 
within deliberative settings, I analysed 
data collected within a deliberative forum, 
where people from different social and 
educational backgrounds were brought 
together in order to discuss issues re-
garding the German welfare state. The 
participants filled out questionnaires before 
and after the forum and took part in large 
and small, moderated group discussions 
throughout a whole day. For this analysis, 
I focus on the discussions that centred on 
the participants’ general attitude regarding 
Germany’s Hartz IV benefit, the fairness 
of the welfare system, and the situation of 
job centres. No information packs were 
distributed prior to the forum, meaning 
that participants’ discussions were based on 
their own political knowledge. During the 
discussions, participants were allowed and 
encouraged to raise their own questions. 
The facilitators were instructed to cover 
the three mentioned topics, but otherwise 
to allow the discussion to continue in 
an unstructured way. The participants 
themselves decided when to participate 
and what knowledge they were willing to 
share in the discussions. Greater details 
on the methodological approach can be 
found in the introduction to this volume 
(cf. Heuer et al.). 
Findings: Level of Political 
Knowledge on Social Welfare 
Subjective and objective knowl­
edge in standardized questions
In the first step I looked at the distribution 
of political knowledge in the ‘traditional’ 
sense by evaluating standardized ques-
tions that participants answered before the 
discussions. Regarding subjective know-
ledge, the participants were asked how 
well informed they felt they were about the 
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welfare state in general on a scale ranging 
from very poorly informed (1) to very well 
informed (5). They were also asked how 
well informed they felt regarding the more 
specific topics of parental leave, pensions, 
social security, healthcare, and the Hartz 
IV benefit. The answers provided ranged 
from very poorly informed to very well 
informed and on average, the participants 
reported feeling fairly well informed about 
the welfare state in general (x– = 3.41, range 
= 1-5). In contrast, the participants’ felt less 
well informed regarding the specific areas 
of the welfare state. They felt least informed 
on the topics of parental leave (x– = 2.8, 
range = 1-5) and pensions, followed in 
increasing order by social security, health 
care, and Hartz IV (x– = 3.3, range = 1-5; 
see online-appendix for summary statistics: 
table 9.2.1 and table 9.2.2). 
To assess their objective, factual knowledge, 
the participants were asked to identify the 
current unemployment rate in Germany and 
the proportion of people who are at risk of 
poverty from a selection of possible answers. 
The unemployment rate and the relative 
poverty rate in Germany were at 6% and 
20% respectively at the time of the survey. 
The questions were selected because they 
Figure 1: Distribution of Participants’ Objective Knowledge Estimates
Source: Own Illustration
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test overall knowledge about the topic and 
are not so specific that an average participant 
could not be expected to know them.
With regards to the unemployment rate 
in Germany, the participants’ answers 
ranged from 5% to 45%, which indicates 
that some participants who were discussing 
the topic of the welfare state were under 
the impression that over a third of the 
population is unemployed. One third of the 
participants identified a percentage range 
that included the correct answer, while two 
thirds overestimated the proportion of 
unemployed people by at least 5%. While 
there were no underestimates, participants 
who overestimated the unemployment rate 
on average did so by at least 13.6% (SD: 
9.4) and assumed an unemployment rate 
of at least 20.6% in Germany; the actual 
rate being 6%. 
There are similar results when it comes to 
the participants’ estimations of the at risk of 
poverty rate. Participants’ answers ranged 
from an at risk of poverty rate estimation 
of 15–19% all the way to more than 50%, 
with less than one third of the participants 
identifying the correct rate and more than 
two thirds overestimating the relative pover-
ty rate by at least 5% (Figure 1). On aver-
age, people who overestimated the relative 
poverty rate did so by at least 15.3% (SD: 
8.4) and assumed a relative poverty rate 
in Germany of at least 37.3%. There is a 
moderate positive correlation between the 
answers given for the unemployment rate 
and for the relative poverty rate (r_s = 0.6, 
p = .0009), meaning that participants who 
overestimated the relative poverty rate also 
tended to overestimate the unemployment 
rate. Looking at the answers to both ques-
tions, six participants (22%) gave correct 
answers in both cases, while the other 21 
(77.8%) were incorrect at least once. 
Implications I 
The results on the levels and distribution 
of subjective and factual knowledge on 
the welfare state are in line with empirical 
findings on the distribution of political 
knowledge in Germany on other topics. 
Since the sample is not collected at random 
and the size is so small, the results cannot 
be generalized beyond this study, but they 
do give an insight into the levels of know-
ledge that the participants in the deliber-
ation I analysed brought with them. The 
findings on subjective knowledge might 
indicate that the Hartz IV system is what 
people mostly associate with the welfare 
state and that their subjective knowledge 
on the general topic was mostly just their 
subjective knowledge on Hartz IV, because 
this is what came to their mind when 
they thought about their knowledge of the 
welfare state in general. It is also plausible 
that people in general feel less confident or 
informed when it comes to specific topics 
compared to more general ones. 
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Only about one-fifth of the participants 
were able to identify the correct employ-
ment and at risk of poverty rates, which 
are two pieces of information that can be 
seen as important if people are to develop 
a rational, informed opinion about the 
welfare state in Germany. It seems that 
the participants felt sufficiently informed 
on a subjective level, but tended to have a 
lack of specific, factual information about 
the target groups who are most relevant 
when discussing the social welfare system.
On a side note: even though this study’s pri-
mary goal was not to look at the relation-
ship between knowledge and education, 
it is noteworthy that while I expected 
knowledge to be positively correlated 
with education, this was only the case for 
objective, factual knowledge; there was no 
substantial difference regarding subjective 
knowledge with regards to education (see 
online-appendix for more details: 9.3.). 
I will now turn to the results from the 
qualitative analysis regarding the differ-
ent kinds of knowledge that participants 
based their arguments on. Do we find a 
discussion including arguments at the 
 societal level—i.e. arguments on the impact 
of certain policies on poverty rates and 
changes in the distribution of wealth—or 
do we find discussions at the particular 
level, based on subjective knowledge such 
as personal experiences? 
Differentiating Knowledge in 
Deliberation
Sources of Political Knowledge
Motivated by the theoretical assumption 
that knowledge in deliberative settings 
enables the formation of normatively 
better opinions, and bearing in mind the 
generally low levels of knowledge in the 
public, I used a qualitative and exploratory 
approach in order to look at the role of 
knowledge in the actual debates. This might 
expand our understanding of how delibera-
tion and political knowledge interact in the 
process of attitude formation and provide 
an understanding of how knowledge can be 
conceptualized and what kinds of know-
ledge are used in exchanges of opinion with 
other people. For the exploratory part of 
the analysis, the participants’ discussions 
were transcribed and read into MaxQDA 
for a qualitative content analysis. In this 
process, I used a coding scheme that was 
partly deductive and partly inductive and 
captured the different kinds of knowledge 
the participants drew on in their argu-
ments. The coding scheme started out 
with previously described categories of 
knowledge from theory such as subjective 
and objective knowledge, further categories 
that appeared in the data were added until 
category saturation occurred.
After briefly introducing the different 
kinds of knowledge that emerged from 
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the  content analysis, I will discuss the 
implications of these categories in the de-
liberation with regards to the deliberative 
goals formulated in theory. In line with 
the literature, I analysed the participants’ 
arguments and statements of opinion based 
on the categories of subjective and objec-
tive knowledge. In the process, further 
distinctions between different sources 
of knowledge emerged within those cat-
egories.
A) Subjective Knowledge: Most arguments 
were based on subjective knowledge, 
which was conveyed in the form of 
personal experiences or observations. 
Looking at the discussion, I can further 
differentiate subjective knowledge into 
knowledge based on personal experi-
ence and knowledge gained from other 
people’s experiences, which I will call 
hearsay. The following quote is a prime 
example for hearsay:
And this trained attendant, who 
does this for several people, told me 
that there are many cases where 
people are flushed out and kicked 
out of statistics, so to speak.(EL1: 62)
Hearsay was used in two different 
ways. On some occasions, it served 
as a substitute for the participants’ 
own experience. In those instances, 
participants would mention that they 
did not have their own experiences 
with the topic and then substituted 
information that they had heard from 
third parties (online-appendix: 9.1.2). 
In other instances (see above), hearsay 
was used to lend more credibility to 
a subjective claim, which is to make 
it more objective by citing a more 
experienced or more credible person.
 
B) Objective Knowledge: Normative de-
liberative theory describes factual 
 information as a necessary deliberative 
circumstance. Yet, in our deliberation 
Figure 2: Overview of Sources of Political Knowledge
Source: Own Illustration
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Normative deliberative theory describes 
factual information as a necessary deliberative 
circumstance. Yet, in our deliberation [...] more 
arguments were based on subjective, 
rather than on factual knowledge
"
this was not the case: more arguments 
were based on subjective, rather than on 
factual knowledge. The factual know-
ledge that participants based their argu-
ments on also ranged from very specific 
information, such as the fact that state 
transfer payments also cover costs of 
acquiring a driver’s licence (ET1: 37) 
to very  general information such as 
information on the recent economic 
growth in Berlin (MIX1: 333). There 
were also instances where participants 
claimed factual, objective information 
that was objectively wrong: ‘There are 
about two million long-term jobless 
people in Germany’ (EL1: 130). 
C) Creativity: In addition to subjective 
and objective knowledge, participants 
also drew on their stored knowledge 
and used their creativity to come up 
with examples that would fit their 
argument or underline it. Those 
 examples were not specifically based 
on personal experience or objective 
facts, but were rather loosely inspired 
by them and tailored to the situation. 
Imagine the following scenario: 
Somebody works their whole life, 
when they are 56, [a locksmith] 
gets laid off and doesn’t find a 
new employment. He falls into 
the Hartz IV category. And then 
they [employees at Jobcenter] say: 
“You’re approaching 60, does it 
even make sense to put you in an-
other training program?” So they 
basically say no. The people have 
worked their whole life, have paid 
taxes their whole life and then they 
get treated like this. (MIX1: 267)
The role of knowledge in the process 
of deliberation
As mentioned before, the weighing of argu-
ments is one of the crucial factors leading to 
positive outcomes in deliberations. Theory 
assumes that participants weigh informa-
tion and then come to a better solution; 
in this respect, the discussion from this 
 deliberation raises some issues that are rele-
vant to the real-world implications of delibe-
rations. In the qualitative content analysis 
of the discussion, it became apparent that 
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 participants’ ability to weigh arguments in 
the deliberation was inhibited for multiple 
reasons, which will be highlighted below. 
A) Generalizability: In a rational discus-
sion, one would expect people to sup-
port arguments with evidence. This 
means that broad and general claims 
at the societal level would be based 
on objective facts, while claims on the 
individual level would also be based 
on personal experiences. In the delibe-
rative forum, when asked to discuss 
their opinion on one aspect of the 
welfare state in Germany, some par-
ticipants talked about what is best for 
society and pitched their arguments 
at that general, societal level, while 
others argued based on what is best 
for them and argued at the specific, 
individual level. Subjective knowledge 
was used as a basis for arguments at the 
 individual level, but also for arguments 
at the societal level, meaning that the 
information participants provided to 
support their arguments did not always 
match the level of generalization that 
the argument was aiming for. 
And at that moment the whole thing 
is unfair, yes. Well, let‘s just say a 
few cases I‘ve had lately: Domestic 
violence: A woman is in the women‘s 
shelter. The whole family situation 
is unclear. The children are unclear. 
Her health is under threat, finances 
are under threat. Everything is in 
dissolution somewhere. And the 
job center demands she submit ten 
job applications a month. That is 
extremely unfair. (MIX1: 66)
In this case, the participant argues 
that the whole system is unfair, but 
only provides subjective experiences 
describing individual occurrences 
of unjust situations; the participant 
does not offer information about how 
common those situations are to justify 
her claim that the system in general 
is unjust. In the deliberation, no one 
pointed to this evidence mismatch, 
which might indicate that people did 
not notice or process this shortcom-
ing. The fact that participants did not 
always make valid claims and argued 
at both the individual and the societal 
level also means that people did not 
necessarily debate at the same level or 
craft linear arguments. On multiple 
occasions, the participants did not 
respond to each other, but started 
talking about their own points of view, 
bringing in new aspects. This made the 
weighing of arguments more difficult 
because it hindered the discussion 
and examination of some aspects or 
thoughts. When a discussion turns 
into a chain of arguments about Hartz 
IV that do not refer to each other, it 
is harder to evaluate them and reach 
a group consensus.
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B) Perspective: Another aspect that also 
connects to different levels of gener-
alizability is perspective. The partici-
pants in the deliberation did not seem 
to put the information provided for a 
specific claim into perspective. This 
became apparent in two ways. First, 
there were the creative examples peo-
ple used, which were highly tailored to 
the argument but did not necessarily 
have a lot of weight when put into the 
perspective of the bigger picture. On 
the question whether Hartz IV is just 
or not, one participant stated: 
[Hartz IV] is unfair, because some 
[people] do not want to work. It 
happens that some simply arrange 
with it and simply says: (sigh) I 
do not want to; I do not feel like 
it. I do not try, even if I write my 
ten  applications [...]. And then the 
taxpayer, meaning the rest of society 
that works and practically contri-
butes with their taxes, finance those. 
And that is unfair. (MIX1: 94)
If looked at from a normative, delibe-
rative perspective, these more or less 
made-up examples can be disadvanta-
geous because they might influence peo-
ple by perfectly fitting their argument, 
while leaving the questions of how often 
and at what rate this particular situa-
tion actually occurs at the societal level 
unanswered. A second way in which 
participants illustrate a lack of perspec-
tive in their weighing of arguments is 
when they provide one positive and one 
negative example in order to describe a 
neutral position towards a topic. Again, 
the weighing process, i.e. the question 
of which situations are more important 
or happen more frequently, is not part 
of the deliberative process:
‘Uh, I would situate myself in the 
middle, because I believe that, so, 
to assess [Hartz IV] generally, is 
totally difficult, because there are 
many aspects in there that are part-
ly fair and partly unjust.’ (ET1: 187)
In these instances, the weighing of ar-
guments can be regarded as  incomplete. 
From a deliberative perspective, it is 
not enough to know that a specific 
situation exists; it is also necessary to 
assess how much weight the situation 
has in relation to the issue under de-
bate (e.g. what is the proportion of fair 
and unfair aspects of Hartz IV?). This 
example also raises the question why 
the participant does not simply weigh 
the just and unjust aspects known 
to them. One possibility is that they 
might need additional information 
that they do not possess. 
C) No knowledge, no opinion: In some 
instances, the participants asked ques-
tions and signalled a lack of informa-
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tion with regards to certain topics or 
the overall topic. Most of the time, the 
participants combined the claim of no 
knowledge with a claim of a neutral 
opinion towards the topic. 
I would just settle for the 5, com-
pletely neutral because, as I said, I 
have no personal experience and I 
only know that by hearsay. (ET1: 61)
When participants stated that they did 
not have an opinion due to a lack of 
information, they did not specify what 
information they would need in order to 
form an opinion. In connection with the 
points raised above, it seems that par-
ticipants do not only lack information, 
but on a more basic level do not always 
know what information they would need 
in order to form an opinion. 
Implications II: Procedural Knowledge
The findings above highlight some areas 
where deliberative settings as described 
in theory seem to be difficult to imple-
ment in real-life debates. It was evident 
that people argue at different levels of 
generalizability, do not necessarily make 
arguments linearly and sometimes do not 
put arguments into perspective. These 
issues, combined with the handling of 
missing knowledge, point to one possible 
conclusion: participants in deliberations 
lack the procedural knowledge necessary 
to weigh information and formulate an 
informed opinion as portrayed in theory. 
How can we overcome these obstacles? It 
may be beneficial in future deliberative 
forums to pay attention to this possible lack 
of procedural knowledge. The following 
suggestions may be useful:
To address generalizability: If a deliberative 
process aims at finding and discussing 
 societal problems and finding solutions at 
the societal level, it might help to struc-
ture the discussion such that the first step 
emphasizes individual experiences and 
opinions and the second step asks partici-
pants to think about and discuss how their 
opinions may change when the emphasis 
is put on the aggregated, societal level.
Handling missing knowledge: The findings 
regarding knowledge gaps in connection 
with neutral opinions raises questions for 
future deliberations. How can facilitators 
deal with missing information? If there are 
questions that come up in a discussion and 
nobody is able to answer them, it would 
be helpful in the future to implement a 
mechanism that enables people to gain 
this information on the spot and overcome 
their uncertainty—moreover, information 
packs should be distributed beforehand. 
In addition to this procedural problem of 
information gaps, a second problem relates 
to knowledge gaps that people might not 
even be aware of they have. Since the public 
often lacks factual information on various 
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problems, future deliberative forums could 
incorporate opportunities for participants 
to improve their procedural knowledge on 
opinion formation by holding a discussion 
in which participants talk about what in-
formation they think is necessary to form 
an informed, reasoned opinion. In order to 
improve the participants’ abilities to weigh 
arguments and information, participants 
could be asked to reflect on and discuss how 
their opinion would change hypothetically 
if certain objective facts change (e.g. What 
difference would it make if the unemploy-
ment rate was 50% compared to 10%).
Outlook
Located within the broader literature on the 
relation between knowledge and attitude 
formation in group discussions, this article 
set out to go beyond pre- and post-questions 
and quantitative analysis and to explore 
the distribution and the role of knowledge 
within a deliberative setting. The descriptive 
analysis revealed mixed levels of factu-
al information among participants, with 
around a fifth of them able to identify the 
German unemployment rate and poverty 
risk rate in Germany and others estimating 
the poverty risk rate to be as high as 50% 
or more. As mentioned in the introduction 
to this volume (Heuer et al), it needs to be 
noted that the participants in this study were 
not selected at random, but rather with the 
goal in mind to capture a heterogeneous 
group with regards to gender, age, political 
preferences and migration background. 
Therefore, descriptive results should not be 
generalized to a broader population. They 
rather serve as informative environment 
within which the arguments made in the 
deliberation are looked at.
The qualitative content analysis uncovered 
the different kinds of knowledge that argu-
ments are based on, which adds to previ-
ous research emphasizing that knowledge 
may not just be subjective or objective but 
alternatively be multifaceted and context 
dependent. This study of a real-world dis-
cussion with people from Berlin drawing 
on their everyday knowledge unfolded 
the many possible deviations from the 
theoretical concept of deliberation. This 
was discussed in terms of generalizability, 
perspective, and knowledge gaps. 
The content analysis of the actual discussion 
also raises questions for further considera-
tion. What patterns of arguments emerge 
within the course of deliberation? This is 
relevant regarding the level of generaliza-
bility and the found mismatches between 
consecutive comments in the deliberation. 
Would participants use more factual in-
formation if they were better informed? 
To distinguish between the role of factual 
and procedural knowledge, further research 
could compare the findings of this work to 
a deliberative discussion with information 
input, in order to determine what kinds 
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of information people rely on in an infor-
mation-rich environment and establish 
whether the distribution of the kinds of 
knowledge utilized in the debate differ from 
the categories identified in this article. Like-
wise, research in this direction would gain 
insights to the question whether people use 
subjective experiences as a substitute for a 
lack of objective, generalizable knowledge. 
The findings here allow scholars to reflect on 
the mechanisms at work in the relationship 
between deliberation and attitude forma-
tion. It might not just be a lack of factual 
knowledge that keeps groups from reaching 
a well-informed, reasoned consensus, but 
also the absence of procedural knowledge. 
We live in a time when Wikipedia is never 
far; hence, getting factual information will 
become less relevant in the future. On a 
more general level, though, we will still need 
procedural knowledge in order to decide 
what information to look for and how to 
evaluate it. Coming back to the beginning 
of this article, instead of asking how much 
knowledge people need to form opinions 
and talk about them, we should ask what 
kind of knowledge people need as well as 
analysing how their opinions change when 
the underlying information changes.
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